/26 cont./

793 will have their talibés vote in favor of their parties. When one
*795 knows what the influence of the marabouts and the discipline
666 of the brotherhood are, one can easily imagine what a formidable ace such an alliance can be for a party. But to be allied with one party is necessarily to be the adversary of the other (or others). If Murid fanaticism (and organization) is thrown into the electoral struggles, it can be the cause of serious troubles. Certainly these troubles would not compromise the loyalty of the brotherhood vis-à-vis the mother country, but they would create serious difficulties for the local administration and the government of the territory.

793 In other respects, deeper reasons can provoke lively op-
*795 position or even struggles between the great Murid leaders and
[665] certain politicians (or certain parties). Thus some Senegalese political personalities are beginning to criticize the way the marabouts act against their talibés. One of them has gone so far as to utter the words "servitude" and "feudalism" in speaking of Muridism /27/ to a high European official. It is certain that a virulent campaign could be made on this theme against the Murid leaders and especially against those whose ostentatious luxury can excite jealousy.

For their part, the Murid marabouts try to maintain their authority and their influence over their disciples and, in that way, over the whole country. They will be opposed to any social or political innovation which will give more power to the masses, and which, by so doing, will risk compromising their authority, counterbalancing it, or even combatting it.
[654] They were thus hostile in 1953 to the transformation of the Société de Prévoyance of Baol into the Société Mutuelle de Production Rurale, on the one hand, because they thought that authority should not be entrusted to the people, and, on the other hand, because they feared that a S. M. P. R. presided over by an African (as was happening already at the time in the circle of Thiès) might be less favorable toward them than the traditional S. P. completely in the hands of the Administration.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

Senegal had never in fact been free from elements of racism, though such a policy was never officially countenanced until the Vichy regime. Geoffrey Gorer found many instances of discrimination in Dakar, and actually went as far as to say that 'The colour bar is extremely strong in Dakar'. But he concluded 'these French citizens are far happier than their brother French Negro subjects; if they are too badly cheated or abused they have some redress in the law courts'. The colour bar was certainly not official policy then as it became under the Vichy Administration.

The Vichy regime marks the end of an era in West Africa and particularly in Senegal: Until 1940 there had been little or no opposition to French assimilationist policy by the Africans. Indeed they were the first to criticise any deviations from it. Blaise Diagne enjoyed high status in France, and though he was accused by his critics of corruption and of selling himself to the French he remained the popular choice in Senegal until his death.

At the ensuing election Galandou Diouf defeated Blaise Diagne's old opponent, Lamine Guèye, who was instrumental in the formation of the Senegalese branch of the *S.F.I.O.* Hitherto elections had been largely fought on the basis of personal followings, with the exception of the European-dominated *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* founded in 1929 in which Europeans played a prominent role. Not only was Lamine Guèye the first Senegalese to realise the value of the party machine, but he was also the first to advocate the granting of full political and legal rights to all French Africans. Significantly he did not suggest any form of break with France, rather that France should carry her assimilationist policy to its logical conclusions. In 1939 he increased his political backing considerably when the *P.S.S.* fused with his section of the *S.F.I.O.* and this was to make him a leading member of the party in the metropolis as well as in Senegal.

However the younger generation of Senegalese were

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

698 641 466 a forty hour week, a minimum wage, the development of trade unions and the institution of a labour inspectorate. However the second Constituent Assembly procrastinated in according these economic rights to its overseas citizens and was dissolved before it could bring them into force. It was only in 1952 that the overseas deputies were able to force this measure through.

698 665 One of the reasons for the break-up of the old *S.F.I.O.* in 1948, which may be taken as symbolic of the reaction against assimilation, was the attitude of the parent party in France to social legislation for the overseas territories. The *S.F.I.O.* had voted against equal pensions for African [641] and metropolitan French veterans; it had voted against the introduction of the French social security system for the overseas departments, and it had abstained on a motion to abolish the dual college system. But more important was the desire of the newly enfranchised 'bush' peasants for greater participation in the direction of party policy. Hitherto the party, closely linked with the parent body in France, had been tightly ruled by Lamine Guèye from Dakar. At the 1947 Congress of the party a group of members led by Senghor demanded a greater voice in party councils. The people of the bush, so long denied the rights accorded to the privileged of the *Quatre Communes*, once enfranchised showed their resentment against both those who exercised these rights and those who granted them. In the following year Senghor, backed not only by the intellectuals but by the vast majority of the bush, founded the *Bloc Democratique Sénégalais* (*B.D.S.*) declaring that 'Assimilation is an illusion in a world whose people have become aware of their own personality'. He attacked the *S.F.I.O.* for its close ties with France and its failure to take an independent line on African matters. So just as Lamine Guèye has been described as the representative [668] of the era of assimilation, so Senghor can be dubbed the representative of reaction to this policy.

698 668 This reaction was at first not part of a concerted

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

movement, though by the late fifties it amounted to a definite revolt against the basic assumption of an assimilationist policy that there was nothing of worth in African culture and that the greatest benefit France could bring to Africans was to make them French. It was hardly surprising that those to whom this policy had been most heavily applied should be the first to react. Thus in political and cultural affairs the Senegalese were in the vanguard of the campaign for the recognition of the African personality, or in French African terms *la négritude*. This new movement showed itself in many fields. In politics it was to manifest itself in a rupture with the metropolitan French parties, and the assertion of the necessity of the incorporation of traditional African values into European-type political systems. On the human plane it insisted on the dignity of the African, the originality of his personality and his contribution to the achievement of the human race. In the cultural field it implied a return to the values of African art, which educated Africans until recently had themselves tended to reject. As regards history, it denied the common European allegation that Africans had no history and asserted that Africans had in fact made a far greater contribution to world history than was revealed in text books. Finally it was to produce a picture of a suffering Africa, exploited and abused by the white man, awakening slowly to a glorious day of freedom.

The policy of Senghor's new party, which was not allied to any metropolitan party, was characteristic of this revolt. Its declared aim was to promote a new form of African socialism, related to the realities of the African situation. Accordingly the party was to be organised to correspond with the socio-ethnic structure of the country. It demanded a greatly increased autonomy for Senegal and other African countries, and whilst not demanding independence, a word that did not touch the public lips of any major French African politician for another ten years, it advocated a federal relationship between France and her overseas territories.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

Those who have not come under the influence of a strong assimilation policy have never had to assert their essential *négritude*. Thus the English-speaking African, whose culture and traditional political organisation was largely left intact by the British administration, was rarely concerned about his identity as an African and until very recently this problem has been of little concern for the Nigerian or Ghanaian. It has never occurred to him to doubt his *négritude*. There are of course a number of examples of what may be called assertion of the African personality in the English-speaking territories, but the cult of *négritude* never caught on in them as it did in Senegal and the other French territories.

Thus it was that the very Africans who had achieved the greatest distinction within the French cultural framework were to be the first to champion a return to the African past in search of their own essential personality. Thus it was that for long Paris became the cultural capital of Africa, for there the books and magazines were published in which they could tell the public of their new ideas. Whilst in the late forties and early fifties the British West African *évolué* was more concerned with the achievement of political independence from Britain, the French African *évolué* was more concerned with his cultural emancipation. Senghor's formation of a new political party is more interesting for the emphasis it lays on its reassertion of African values than for any proposed political rupture with France.

The reaction against assimilation, as P. Mercier has pointed out in *Elites Sénégalaises*, came essentially from the new educated generation.

> It is the elite that has given expression to this desire for a return to the fountain head . . . From an acceptance of assimilation characteristic of the preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then the attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 against the society (which he has so brilliantly elucidated)—where do I stand in relation to that culture?'

Alioune Diop declared:

> Assimilation corresponds to a type of human relationship imposed by colonisation. It demands that the individual (for it affects only individuals) tear himself from his natural context and he who cannot assert his own personality must replace his habits of thinking, feeling and acting by others which he would only share with a foreign community.

By the time of this congress the Senegalese, as well as other Africans, had examined pretty thoroughly the whole question of French assimilation. For instance, A. Wade, a Senegalese, in a paper entitled 'Must Africa evolve a [671] positive law?', protested against the use in his country of a foreign legal system evolved in a different social context and which could not meet all the requirements of traditional society. He called for a new legal system which would be in effect a synthesis of African customary law and French law. In another article he called for a reform of teaching methods in Africa in the light of local conditions. There [571] were few stones this anti-assimilationist élite left unturned in their efforts to re-establish the values of the African past. They presented a dramatic contrast with the élite of the pre-war generation who, like the young men in Ousmane Socé Diop's *Karim*, so readily accepted the virtues of Western ways.

668 Amongst this group were a number who fell back not on
648 the values of the African past so much as Marxist theories in their attacks on colonialism and assimilationist policy. Principal amongst this group was Majhemout Diop, leader of the pro-Communist *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence*. [665] In issue No. 14 of *Présence Africaine* he attacked colonialism bitterly:

> There is no possible ambiguity; colonisation equals capitalistic enterprise. Any other explanation is invalid, is deceitful, a myth, a myth of civilisation and of co-operation.
>
> A coloniser cannot be humanitarian . . . that would be the

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

most irreducible of paradoxes. Colonisation is always measured in terms of gain for the coloniser.

Between colonialist and colonial there is room only for forced labour, intimidation, pressure, police, theft, rape, obligatory farming, scorn, mistrust, arrogance, self-conceit, deceit, suppressed élites and debased masses.

No human relationship but a relationship based on domination and submission which transform the coloniser into a pawn, an adjutant, a warder, a flogger and the native into an instrument of production.

The resentment of assimilation is the same. But the interpretation is a Marxist one and the remedies subsequently offered by Majhemout Diop were non-African in origin. His *Contribution to the Study of Political Problems in Black Africa* is almost entirely Marxist in inspiration and the source matter, abundantly evident from the footnotes, is the work of Stalin, Lenin, Engels and Marx, none of whom had any first-hand knowledge of economic conditions in Africa. Another Senegalese, of very distinguished academic reputation, who uses Marxist techniques in his studies of African problems, is Ly Abdoulaye, an economic historian who nevertheless is much more inclined to take into account African circumstances in the application of Marxist theories. Indeed Ly is at great pains to avoid Marxist terminology even when employing Marxist ideas. There are in fact few Senegalese intellectuals who are not in some sense Marxist socialists. But more especially they are devotees of what they call African socialism.

In the search for identity that followed the application of assimilationist policy, the first tendency was to rehabilitate African culture. Naturally political rehabilitation was one of the most important goals for politicians like Senghor. But when he broke with the *S.F.I.O.* in 1948, he gave as one of his reasons that French socialism, like Communism, after all, 'did not understand our problems, and wanted to solve them with a plan devised by and for Europe'. His proposed alternative of 'African socialism' was at the time

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 very ill-defined. But with the necessity of finding a new
[665] political system appropriate to the African situation there evolved, particularly in Senegal, a fairly coherent doctrine which will be examined in the final chapter.

In the early days a number of assertions were made about the political genius of the African, none of which can be attributed to any one man though as far as Senegal has been concerned Senghor has been the chief theoretician. Whilst appreciating and accepting many of Marx's theories as both politically and economically valid for Africa he believed that Marx would have revised his system in face of African realities as well as the scientific achievements of the twentieth century. He advocated the adoption of Marxism, shorn of its anti-religious doctrine and adapted to African needs. A cardinal point as far as Senghor was concerned, was that African society could not fit into the classical Marxist analysis. Instead he maintained modern African society
[565] had three classes: first the liberal professions and trades; second the salaried employees, civil servants and workers; third the vast peasant mass. Under the colonial regime the former two classes had been able to achieve incomes out of all proportion to the average peasant income of fourteen pounds a year. This peasant class is Marx's proletariat.

To support his policital views, Senghor advanced his theory that the 'Negro-African' was essentially different from the European. 'The African Negro does not distinguish the object nor does he analyse it—he takes it as it is between his hands, he feels it, touches it, smells it; thus the subject and the object are dialectically confronted in the very act of perception, and hence participation and communion.' Others, in their suggestions for a modern African political system showed how they could look to their own (somewhat idealised) African past for guidance. For instance there was no real need for opposition in the European sense. African politics in the village would supply the model. There everyone sat in the palaver house until all were agreed on the formula of action. Once discussed openly

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

VI. TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The choice of the Senegalese people is independence; they want it to take place only in friendship with France, not in dispute.

LÉOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR (September 1958)

IT was not until 1951 that Senghor was able to test the strength of his new party at the elections for the French National Assembly in which it gained both seats with 213,000 votes to the *S.F.I.O.*'s 90,000. His success was proved the next year when he won forty-one out of the fifty seats in the *Conseil-General* under the new and greatly enlarged franchise. His vote came overwhelmingly from the 'bush', since Lamine Guèye still retained strong support in Dakar and St. Louis. The party ticket was a popular one: accusing the French Administration of supporting socialists in the towns and chiefs in the bush.

From a theoretical standpoint as we have seen the *B.D.S.* fitted into the new anti-assimilationist trend in Senegal. It represented the 'unsophisticated' bush against the Gallicised *citoyens* of the *Quatre Communes*. It demanded a return to African values and had an essentially African-style organisation in the bush. But few real differences showed themselves on the platforms adopted by the two parties at the elections.

In the French National Assembly Senghor had joined forces with a number of other deputies from African territories who like himself did not wish to link themselves with one of the metropolitan parties. This group was known as the *Indépendents d'Outre Mer*. As a result of the elections the *I.O.M.* gained thirteen seats, enough to form a recognised group in the National Assembly. However they were never able to mould themselves into a united federal party on the lines of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (*R.D.A.*)

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648
625

which had been founded by M. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in 1946 and which had branches in all African territories. This party had been closely aligned with the Communists from which it adopted many ideas including its cellular structure, but it was temporarily suppressed by French administrative action because of its extreme and violent tactics, especially in the Ivory Coast. It had however by 1952 broken with the Communists, but in its weakened state it might have found it difficult to rival a well organised *I.O.M.* which was more than just a group of individuals with like ideas. However at their conference at Bobo Dioulasso the *I.O.M.* failed once more to form the necessary federal organisation to compete with either the *R.D.A.* or *S.F.I.O.* as a Pan-African party. Nevertheless the *I.O.M.* were able to play an increasingly important role in the National Assembly in the formation of delicate French government coalitions and were often able to extract as the price of their support concrete returns in the form of aid.

In Senegal the political scene remained calm until the 1956 elections to the National Assembly when the *B.D.S.* came out with what by French African standards was a nationalist programme. As Kenneth Robinson remarks in his admirable study of this and the 1957 elections to the territorial assembly in *Five Elections in Africa*, 'among politically conscious West Africans there has undoubtedly been for several years increasing nationalist feeling, a mood more and more outspokenly hostile to colonial rule, less and less interested in the refinements of juridical forms, more impatient of reformist schemes, and more and more determined that Africans must be masters in their own house'. Thus the *B.D.S.* put strong emphasis on autonomy within a federal association with France. The *B.D.S.* won both seats, with the socialists still strong in the *Quatre Communes*. But on the federal West African level, the *I.O.M.* had done badly and Houphouët Boigny's *R.D.A.*, now purged of its connexions with Communism, a purge

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

that involved the breaking-away of a number of small sections in various territories, emerged as West Africa's leading party with nine seats, and joined the Guy Mollet Government. Under this Government the famous *loi cadre* was passed establishing for each of the black African territories a wholly elected assembly, based on universal adult suffrage. An executive, that could be drawn from within or without the assembly, was established. Although the territorial Governor presided over it, it was effectively guided by the Vice-President or Prime Minister. Separate rolls for Europeans were abolished. Thus in one fell swoop all African territories were given the elements of responsible democratic government. Certainly their powers were restricted since a large number of subjects were reserved to the Federation, still run by the French High Commissioner, and checked only by the *Grand Conseil*. The *loi cadre*, whilst it did not envisage independence, and still saw the future of the African territories as within the structure of the French body politic, did in effect set these territories on the road to independence. Senghor, an ardent critic of the *loi cadre*, declared: 'The peoples of Africa do not intend to cut themselves off from metropolitan France; they want to be able to construct, side by side with her, their own buildings which will consolidate and extend French territory.'

The *loi cadre*, whilst it made large concessions to African demands for autonomy, was in fact designed to avoid demands for independence. The new French Government had been influenced to this end by France's unfortunate experiences in other parts of her empire as well as the political progress of the Gold Coast. Furthermore she wished to anticipate moves by the Gold Coast to absorb that part of the former German Togo which she administered and therefore accorded it a limited form of internal autonomy. It was inevitable that having granted this concession to Togo she would eventually have to make it to neighbouring French African territories as well. Whilst considerable

5! Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

powers were devolved on the individual territories, it is clear that a desire to avoid any ultimate break-up of the French Union was one of the main factors behind the emasculation of the federal executive. French West Africa as a federation might soon be demanding independence; eight small territories on their own would find it a more daunting prospect.

Senghor attacked France vigorously for what he called the balkanising of French Africa by devolving powers on individual territories and at the same time making no provision for an executive at the federal level. The *Grand Conseil* retained only its limited legislative powers. Executive action for the federation was still undertaken by the High Commissioner, representing the Republic. By thus turning politics towards the individual territories, France was 'balkanising' the federation, following the classic pattern of dividing in order to rule. Bitterly, he accused the French of offering Africa 'sucettes et bonbons'. It may seem odd that the role of defending the federation should have fallen on Senghor, who had already failed to convert the *I.O.M.* from an association of deputies into a Pan West African political party. But though the R.D.A. was officially a Pan-African party, its leader came from the rich Ivory Coast, and disliked intensely the ideas of sharing his country's wealth with his many poorer neighbours. He was instrumental in securing the form of *loi cadre* that avoided the creation of a supra-government. On the other hand it might be argued that it was in Senegal's interest to ensure that the federation did not break up, since one of Dakar's *raisons d'être* was as a federal capital. But Senghor argued cogently that only with a strong West Africa, containing twenty million people, could Africans participate with any sense of political equality and weight of personality with France in the proposed Franco-African Community. 'Within the framework of a French federal republic, a French West Africa of 20 million inhabitants can, side by side with the metropolis, form a stable element and develop its own personality!

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

develop its own personality.' The *S.F.I.O.* parties of Africa met in Conakry to found a new socialist party entirely African in basis, called the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain.* Thus after over twenty years Lamine Guèye officially broke one of Senegal's closest links with France. At the same time Senghor called a congress of his allies in other territories from the *I.O.M.* and formed a federal party called the *Convention Africaine.* There were thus three new major African parties, with sections in most of the eight territories of West Africa and some in *A.E.F.*, each preaching African unity. But the federal executive, the very structure through which this could be maintained, was missing.

At the *loi cadre* elections that took place at the end of March 1957, the *R.D.A.*, the most thoroughly organised on the ground, proved the strongest party of the three and in West Africa and gained overwhelming majorities in Soudan, Guinea and Ivory Coast, dominated the coalition in Upper Volta and provided the opposition in Niger and Dahomey. But the party, as was soon proved at the long delayed Bamako Conference of September 1957, was far from united. Its main difference was over the problem of the federal executive. Its President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast had, as a Minister in the French Government, been one of the principal architects of the *loi cadre* and was opposed to the creation of a federal executive. The *R.D.A.*'s very dynamic Vice-President, Sékou Touré of Guinea, formed in the tough school of trade unionism, however championed the creation of a federal executive, and in this respect he was closer to Senghor than to his own party chief. At the Bamako Conference Sékou Touré persuaded the party to adopt it as a prime objective.

Meanwhile in Senegal, ever the source of new things, was born the first African party with the avowed object of independence, the *P.A.I.* (*Parti Africain de l'Indépendence*) led by Majhemout Diop, who had strong Communist sympathies. Till then the word independence had been

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

studiously avoided not only by Senegalese but by nearly all leading French African politicians. The official formula was the creation of a Franco-African community, in which Africans would have fully autonomous states (or federations if Senghor and Sékou Touré had their way) and matters like defence and foreign affairs would be shared between France and the other member states. As far as the Senegalese were concerned their long attachment to France, despite their reaction against assimilationism, made it difficult to countenance the idea of complete separation. As Senghor always put it, 'fédérer n'est pas séparer.' Furthermore French aid to West Africa in general and Senegal in particular had been enormous.

The Senegalese thesis on federation made headway in the early months of 1958. After several meetings between the major African parties, the *Convention Africain* and the *M.S.A.* met in Dakar in March and formed the new *Parti du Regroupement Africain*, with the aim of obtaining Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa, which in turn would be federated with France in the proposed Franco-African community. On 5 April 1958 the *P.R.A.* members of the *Grand Conseil*, plus the *R.D.A.* members, voted in favour of the creation of a federal executive; the only Ivory Coast delegate abstained.

Despite bitterness over the question of the federal executive, there was still little open talk about independence except by the *P.A.I.* and this despite the example of Ghana. This situation was to be abruptly changed by the *putsch* of the military in Algiers on 13 May.

In presenting his new constitution for the Fifth Republic to the French people, de Gaulle made it a straight choice of Yes or No. As far as the French were concerned this was a reasonable choice. Acceptance or rejection. Once rejected, there was the possibility of trying again as they had done in 1946. But as far as the overseas territories were concerned, they were given no alternative. They either accepted the constitution, whose details we shall examine

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

returning from France imbued with anti-colonialist ideas made the issue of independence a burning one. Yet the difficulty of making a complete break with her cultural parents was made clear by Joseph Ma Thiam, a member of F.E.A.N.F. (Federation of Students from French Black Africa) who wrote: 'We are not anti-French, that would be ridiculous and impossible. We are simply Africans and we want not minor reforms, called *loi-cadre* or Community, but a revolution of which the necessary outcome will be independence, as this is conceived of and put into practice in the twentieth century.'

For the Senegalese leaders, as indeed for other African leaders, the choice was a difficult one. The idea of sudden rupture with France, which de Gaulle's choice implied, was not only economically terrifying, but rather like the impending break-up of a family. So many of the leaders had lived so much of their lives in Paris that the prospect of such imminent separation was difficult to contemplate. It is against this background that the conference of the *P.R.A.* at Cotonou from 25-27 July 1958 must be seen. Here delegates met to consider the situation created by the projected new constitution. At that stage the terms of the constitution were not clearly known, though it was general knowledge that they would not be favourable to the idea of total independence. At the conference delegates were carried away by demands for independence and voted for 'Immediate independence; the creation of a solid and progressive African Community; and negotiation with France for the creation of a multi-national confederation of free and equal peoples.' The last two items were in accord with current Senegalese feeling that federation was the only way to secure equality of the African personality in a Franco-African Community. But the morrow of the conference saw a number of delegates reflecting on the demand for immediate independence. The rupture seemed too abrupt and, as Mamadou Dia pointed out, they did not even know the terms of the new constitution. He expressed doubts on

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

the ability of Senegal to accede immediately to independence. In certain territories, particularly in Senegal and Dahomey, pressure was brought to bear by France on the delegates against taking so drastic a step, so that the *P.R.A.* withdrew from its earlier stand and said that effectively the decision over the constitution would be left to each territorial section. In August the burning question for both the *P.R.A.* and *R.D.A.* was answered by General de Gaulle on his tour of Africa prior to the referendum in September. The right of independence would be inscribed in the constitution. But, he later added ominously, those who voted No to his constitution now would take all the consequences. For all states so economically dependent on France this was a considerable threat. Thus few leaders did in fact campaign against the constitution. In Guinea, Sékou Touré with a superb party organisation, managed to obtain a 97 per cent vote against the constitution and took independence with all its consequences, which involved the French destroying all their files and even taking away the telephones! In Niger the Premier, Djibo Bakary failed to carry his campaign against the constitution, and was forced reluctantly to resign, and after the subsequent election which was won by his *R.D.A.* opponents, to flee the country. In this matter it was said, the French who suspected Djibo Bakary of extreme left-wing sympathies were determined not to have 'a hole in the desert'.

In Senegal the situation was confused. Not until the last minute did the *P.R.A.* come out definitely in favour of the constitution. De Gaulle received a hostile reception on his visit to Dakar. Three radical members of the *P.R.A.* Ly Abdoulaye, Assane Seck and Amadou M. M'Bow declared they would vote No, whatever the rest of the Party decided. On 11 December the *P.R.A.* section of the Senegal party decided to vote Yes. The three members who had declared they would vote No resigned, formed a new party confusingly called *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and joined with the *P.A.I.* and campaigned against de Gaulle. Once the decision of the

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 majority party had been made, however, there was little
668 doubt as to the outcome of the Referendum. But the seeds
[665] of independence had been sown.

Almost immediately after the Referendum the planners got down to work seeking to create the federal executive that had escaped them under the *ancien régime*. Guinea meanwhile had become independent and there was a certain satisfaction amongst those who voted Yes at the difficulties so abrupt a break with France entailed. Alas, as was later realised, Guinea independent and the rest still within the Community, meant the first crack in the old federation. On 29 December delegates from Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, together with observers from Mauretania, met to consider the possibility of creating a new federation.

On 17 January 1959 a federal constitution was promulgated with the accord of all four governmental delegations, and the new Mali came into being. However pressures from France and from Houphouët-Boigny, who still bitterly opposed any form of federation, soon forced Upper Volta and Dahomey to withdraw, reducing Mali to two member states: Senegal and Soudan.

648 The new federation was short lived. In Soudan there had
665 been almost unanimous support for the federation, but in Senegal a number of religious chiefs, in association with Ibrahim Seydou N'Daw, formerly President of the Senegalese Assembly, and an important member of the governing *U.P.S.* party, formed the Senegalese Solidarity Party and together with the two left-wing parties, the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence* and the *P.R.A.*—Senegal campaigned
[666] against the proposed federation. At the polls the Government won a resounding victory.

Thus in both Senegal and Soudan the leaders who had chosen the path of federation won triumphant approval, though as Mamadou Dia admits somewhat ruefully, the people followed their leaders blindly on this question. It is essential here to note that the two countries were

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

governed by different parties, and in each territory that party held all the parliamentary seats. In any election to the Federal Assembly, which was by nomination of each territorial house of an equal number of seats, there could well be deadlock. However on 24 March 1959 Soudanese and Senegalese met in Dakar to form the new African Federalist Party, to which delegates from Niger and Dahomey came. The new party was formed, then, from the *R.D.A.* of Soudan, the *U.P.S.* which was the official Senegal Section of P.R.A., which in effect contained both *M.S.A.* and *Convention Africaine* as well as the small Senegal *R.D.A.* the Niger *P.R.A.* (in effect *M.S.A.*) and the Dahomey *P.R.A.* Thus, with the exception of the small *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and the small *P.A.I.*, Mali had only one effective party. This detailed composition shows that the Mali Federation could not then be called a one-party state. Indeed the local politicians described their party as a 'unified party', which admitted opposition outside the party as well as within.

From the start the Mali Federation ran into difficulties with France, which initially refused to recognise her existence. Thus Modibo Keita did not attend the first three meetings of the executive council of the Community because of this failure to recognise the State of which he was head. However de Gaulle soon realised that Mali was there to stay and gave her recognition and Modibo Keita attended the fourth meeting of the Community Executive at Tananarive in Madagascar. It was not long before the leaders of Mali decided to take advantage of the clause in the constitution which apparently allowed members of the Community to become independent and yet remain members. For long the French Government would not commit itself to granting independence, and only when the question was raised at the sixth meeting of the Community Executive at St. Louis in Senegal on 13 December did de Gaulle give it his blessing. But there followed long and protracted negotiations over the terms of independence,

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

C48 the main drawback for Mali being the concessions she had to make over the military base at St. Louis. Far from cutting [651] Mali off without a penny as she had Guinea, France promised to continue her aid. Mali's decision to take independence marked the beginning of the end of the Franco-African Community, and indeed of France's political assimilation of her African states.

This done, the Mali Federation was all set for independence. But there were internal hurdles to overcome. Mali may well have been ruled by a unified party, but there were definite differences between Soudanese and Senegalese. Soudan was the larger, more populous territory, but the poorer. It was much more left wing and politically was run very much more strictly than Senegal. The party controlled everything. To appreciate this one must remember [665] that the *R.D.A.* was initially allied to the Communists and had adopted their cell technique for its own party organisation. This system of administration proved most effective and explains why Sékou Touré was able to keep so firm a hold on Guinea after the French had gone. Senegal, however, after three centuries of contact with the French, was much more affected by French ideas of liberty [641] and certainly found this rather ruthless element in its Soudanese partner disturbing. For instance at the constitutional conference preceding independence the Soudanese demanded that a unitary state be created, and that the excess burden of two territorial governments be removed. They also wanted a president with strong powers like those enjoyed by de Gaulle. The Senegalese, who saw many dangers to themselves in such a constitution protested successfully on the moral grounds that it would prevent other states from joining Mali—which was after all the federation's main *raison d'être*. The Senegalese won the day after bitter wrangling. Of course, though Senegal as the richer partner effectively subsidised the federation, she had her own interests in maintaining it since Soudan exported [439] its ground-nuts along the railway from Bamako to Dakar.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 more backward in every way—one could try and dominate the other. Indeed Senegal felt she was subsidising Soudan whilst that territory, it was believed, was taking all the plum jobs. Third, in such a federation it was not surprising that there should be a clash of personalities between the two regional leaders, Senghor and Modibo Keita. They proved quite incompatible, each representing entirely different political traditions. And though nominally they now belonged to the same political party the *P.F.A.*, in fact they had entirely different outlooks. Modibo Keita represented a country of considerable poverty, with a very small educated élite, where ministers worked in the fields for three weeks each year. The population undertook voluntary labour on government projects. Altogether it was a puritan, left-wing regime anxious to lift its peoples out of their age-long poverty, intolerant of opposition and very ascetic in its approach to life.

The Senegalese were almost entirely opposite in every [665] way. Politically the *U.P.S.* was much more liberal, flanked on either side by extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing opposition parties. Indeed the *U.P.S.* itself was an amalgamation of two parties. Senegal by comparison, was much richer, the population less interested in the type of ascetic left-wing politics practised in Mali. But above all the conflict between the two came from their widely different political histories. Senegal had nearly 150 years' experience of European-style politics, Soudan barely fourteen. The conflict between the sophisticated communes and the neglected bush that had been instrumental in Senghor's foundation of the *B.P.S.* in 1948, seemed to be repeating itself in a new form. The Soudanese found it difficult to co-operate with their sophisticated neighbours who seemed to take politics and indeed life far less seriously than they did, who seemed too identified with France as a result of long contact and the latter's policy of assimilation. This conflict seemed to be embodied in the personalities of their two leaders. Senghor, poet, philosopher, political

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

463 [563] has enjoyed a much higher rate of education than was possible in an Islamic community like Senegal, even taking into account French assimilation policy.

There is a pronounced bias in Senegal against entering into commerce, whether at the African level or at the European level. This bias has been observed by many Europeans. It may be thought of as a mere attempt to explain away the lack of success or rather a lack of desire and intention to Africanise commerce, but against this view, M. Assane Seck, one of the leaders of the Opposition [665] *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and a lecturer at the university, who might normally be only too pleased to pin the slow rate of Africanisation of commerce on the Government, has said that one of the chief obstacles to the Africanisation of economy at its higher levels is the preference of the Senegalese élite, [591] and even the lesser educated classes, for work in the Administration. [647] Under the French the Administration seems to have enjoyed a very high status especially as rates of pay [465] have always been considerably higher than in commerce and industry. Commerce, even when it pays better, has among the Senegalese something of the smear it had in ninteenth-century England.

471 [472] Another barrier to the Africanisation of shopkeeping and small scale private enterprise is the difficulty the Senegalese have in amassing capital. The obligations towards members [596] of the extended family are such that a man with money has calls made on it from even his most distant relatives. This social parasitism is much stronger in Senegal than in most West African countries. One of the few important Senegalese business men operating in Dakar today has admitted that he had to reduce his family obligations drastically, not only because he was married to a European, but because unless he did so, he would never be able to keep enough capital in his business. Diop Abdoulaye, in his study of the Toucouleur, [736] has protested against the use of the term family parasitism for something which 'makes it possible to help those in need, the unemployed, for example, who can then

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

immense impact of the town. They live in small villages made up of relations and fellow villagers. They even club together, subscribing to a common fund to receive their fellows from the Fleuve, and as far as work is concerned they virtually monopolise certain jobs such as bootboys, waiters, and newspaper sellers. This maintenance of tribal cohesion is a difficult task in this city of French creation, where a new community of Dakarois is rapidly coming into existence.

An important factor in the breakdown of tribal ties has been the creation of political parties and the creation of a new political élite that thinks in national terms. Experience in Africa has shown, however, that this can work two ways, for many political parties are in effect organisations intended to defend ethnic interests. Senegalese politics have on the whole been remarkably free from tribalism, though Senghor did in fact achieve much of his success in the early days of the *B.D.S.* though the emphasis he laid on ethnic considerations in the organisations of his party, and certainly there have existed specifically regional and ethnic parties like *Le Mouvement Démocratique Casamançais* and the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.* But, as Kenneth Robinson pointed out in his study of Senegalese politics in *Five Elections in Africa*, these ethnic and regional aspects were compensated for by the federal aspect of the major party, *Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.* In 1954, in fact, all ethnic and regional sub-sections of the *B.D.S.* were abolished and individual membership was insisted on. But though this led to the breaking-away of certain elements in the Casamance, it would be fair to say that the party has been much less dominated by those regional differences that normally influence political parties in West Africa. Nevertheless, as Robinson found in the 1957 election, there were a number of constituencies where ethnic rivalries were more important than political issues. At Linguère, a single member constituency, the population was divided between Fula and Wolof in the proportion of three to two. When the sitting member, a Fula, was

[i.e., The Moors and Toucouleurs in Dakar--Analyst]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS 30

renominated, the Wolofs created a *Bloc Démocratique du Djollof* which polled 6,000 votes to the 8,000 of the Fula candidate.

A further commentary on the lack of tribalism in Senegal is the ethnic structure of the Government and the national assembly. The Government is composed of the President of the Republic, who is a Serer, a President of the Council of Ministers who is Toucouleur with strong Wolof ancestry, and fourteen Ministers of whom nine are Wolof, two are half-caste, one a Frenchman who has opted for Senegalese nationality, one a Diola and one a Lebou.

The ethnic repartition of the Senegalese National Assembly is equally revealing*:

Tribe	*Percentage of population*	*Number of Deputies*	*Percentage of Deputies*
Wolof	35·0	33	41
Serer	16·0	5	6
Lebou	0·2	10	13
Toucouleur	9·0	10	13
Fula	17·0	5	6
Diola	9·0	5	6
Mandingo/Bambara	7·0	3	4
European	0·1	3	4
Metis	0·1	5	6
Rest	4·7	1	1

The above figures, with the reservations footnoted, show that the National Assembly with one or two exceptions

* These figures were supplied to me by William J. Foltz and are based on his own research and ethnic data from the *S.E.R.E.S.A. Rapport General* 1ère partie, Ch. 1., p. 38. The population figures are based on old administrative censuses, which may be somewhat conservative. The figures for the Lebou seem surprisingly low. Furthermore, placing deputies under a particular ethnic grouping is often an arbitrary process, since it is in the educated classes that the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriage occurs. Furthermore the large number of Wolofs can partly be explained by the fact that anyone of mixed ethnic origin, in which one parent is Wolof, tends to call himself Wolof.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

563 them strict enough Muslims, the main distinguishing [433] feature of their homeland, the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal, [735] is its poverty compared with that of other parts of Senegal. Diop Abdoulaye in his study of Toucouleur immigration into Dakar estimates that the average *per capita* income of a Toucouleur of that region is little more than 4,000 *C.F.A.* [434] per annum, i.e. about £6 a year. It is this rather than any real tribal differences that makes the Vallée a special problem, and this as much as any ethnic factor accounted [665] for the existence of the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.*

563 619 The only real minority area in the Senegal is the Casamance, whose special position is further emphasised by its separation from the main block of Senegal by the Gambia. In the past it has been thought of as geographically, economically, socially and even religiously separate from the rest of Senegal. A forest zone closer to its neighbours Portuguese Guinea and the Republic of Guinea, it remained very underdeveloped by the French, though the present Government is taking this fact into account with a special development programme for the area. This separateness was emphasised by the very name Casamance. The people describe themselves to this day as *Casamançais* rather than Senegalese, though this could well be accepted on the same terms as a Briton describing himself as Scots or Welsh. It is fortunate that the tendency is to talk in terms of regional rather than tribal origin. However one of the important factors in the Casamance has been tribal. The Diolas were until very recently an animist people with an entirely different social organisation from that of the main groups of Senegal, though as we have already pointed out they had traditional ties with the Serer which went as far as the injunction that a Diola should never spill the blood of a Serer. But today the Diola are being drawn into the main socio-religious pattern of Senegal. In the most recent estimate of the religious [162] adherence of the population of Casamance, estimated at [771] 327,500, 284,000 were Muslims, only 28,000 Christians and

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

the rest animists. Of course this includes the exclusively Muslim Mandingo inhabitants of the Casamance who have been largely responsible for this proselytisation. The Diola too is inclined more and more to imitate his Mandingo and Wolof neighbours. L. V. Thomas, who has written a monumental study on the Diola, fears: 'Soon the Diola country may be, at least in its landscape, like Senegal if no power intervenes to limit the extension of the bushfire; it will certainly become, in its people, just another African country, where only a few anthropological remains fixed by heredity will enable us to distinguish the Diola from the Wolof or the Mandingo.'

The Casamance may well be coming closer to the rest of the Senegal, but it still remains a seat of opposition to the Government of Senghor and Dia, and votes heavily for the opposition *P.R.A.-Sénégal*. However neither of the leaders of this party, Ly Abdoulaye or Assane Seck, is *Casamançais*, and there is strong support in many towns for the *U.P.S.*, which indicates that Diola-Casamance politics are not necessarily either regional or tribal, though these are important factors.

The main social problem of the Senegal, and one which both assimilation and religion seem to have been unable to break down, is that of caste or a class structure very similar to caste. All the main Senegalese tribes—the Wolof, Lebou, Toucouleur, Serer—are divided into a series of endogamous castes. These castes differ slightly from tribe to tribe, but roughly they are divided thus:

Nobles and Freeborn
Artisans (jewellers, smiths, weavers, leatherworkers)
Griots or minstrels
Liberated slaves
Slaves

(Of course domestic slaves no longer exist as such in Senegal, but families know who their slaves were.)

It is certainly easier in Senegal for a Toucouleur noble to marry a Wolof noble than to marry a woman of inferior

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

equal status to all Senegalese and wanted to make everyone true Senegalese citizens whether they were griots, leather-workers or jewellers. Afterwards the non-griots agreed that the griots who had just died should be buried 'in the same way as anyone else, and as a beginning they agreed to let the burial of the victim of the incident take place, not in the traditional baobab but in Diack earth.'

In the Government today there are, amongst those members belonging to tribes with a class system only two of inferior caste, one being a 'bijoutier' and one a griot. It is said of another that he is of slave origin, but this is not certain because politicians often try to attribute inferior caste to their opponents. In the Assembly, of the members with caste all are noble or freeborn with the exception of one 'bijoutier', and one griot. It is thus at present difficult to get on in politics unless one is noble or freeborn. Indeed chiefly connexion is important, even though chiefs are no longer of significance administratively. Thus in 1957 Kenneth Robinson wrote:

> Membership of chiefly families is, nevertheless, an important source not only of prestige but of political interest. In many interviews with political leaders in the smaller townships and villages they almost invariably defined their own position, and that of their fellows, in part by reference to their relationship with the ruling families, or with the indigenous caste system.

Mr. William Foltz, who is making a detailed survey of Senegalese politics, has however observed that the local party groups in the country are increasingly representative of the inferior castes and many of the important backroom boys are of inferior caste, which suggests that there may be a change from the present situation at the next elections. But so far, as Mercier has observed, it does not look as though high standing in the modern context can yet completely redeem traditional inferiority.

The caste system in Senegal is one of the most delicate problems confronting the Senegalese Government today.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

upon to play a historic role will be neither Negro, Berber, nor Arab nations, nor Christian, Muslim, nor animist nations. They will surely be strongly marked by the influence of different biological factors, and by the influence of different philosophies of their environment; but they will be nothing if not a synthesis, if not a civilisation. It is under this condition that they will be truly active element in the post-Marxian revolution of the twentieth century.

Reading the political philosophy of both Senghor and Mamadou Dia, one is tempted to say this humanism is all very admirable but what have such high-flown ideas got to do with a nation of three million poor people still living barely above subsistence level and of whom the majority of adults are still illiterate? Indeed, Senghor the philosopher and poet comes in for criticism by some students of African politics for his advocacy of this cultural cross breeding, for his apparent excessive attachment to the West. Will not, they ask, someone more African, more a politician and less a poet, be more typical of the African politicians of the future? This is perhaps not only to misunderstand Senghor, but also the Senegalese. Senghor may seem to live in the clouds, uttering fine phrases in enviable French, but the last fifteen years have shown him as a masterly political tactician. He broke away from Lamine Guèye and the *S.F.I.O.* to form his own party at just the right psychological moment. And when he felt an end had to be brought to the Mali Federation he accomplished it without shedding one drop of blood, to the surprise not only of foreign observers but particularly of his Soudanese partners. Today opposition to Senghor comes mainly from fellow intellectuals, whilst his standing with the people of the countryside remains high. His opposition is no less inclined to lengthy discourses on the philosophical foundations of the state. Ly Abdoulaye and Assane Seck of the *P.R.A.* are both of the University of Dakar; Majhemout Diop of the *P.A.I.* is a doctrinaire Communist; and Cheikh Anta Diop, as we have seen, has spent most of his Time on the rehabilitation of African history.

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

[571] [178] preserve much of their prestige;[1] they are sometimes in diametrical opposition to the modernist elites and sometimes try to come to terms with them; occasionally, as the result of historical conditions, the two elites are closely interlocked.[2]

4. Types and degree of tension between the African modernist elites and the European groups. The latter occupy the position of ruling class in the whole community represented by each territorial unit. The conflict is fundamental, yet a balance, however temporary and precarious, between the two groups may sometimes be discerned, though it varies enormously in degree from one region to another and at different times.[3]

The situation in Senegal, compared with that in other parts of French West Africa, exhibits certain special features. Senegal was the first of these territories to be colonized.[4] At the beginning of the new phase which opened after the war, it had the largest number of educated and partly Westernized persons, and it has for several decades had a political life modelled on the West, though of a summary and limited character.[5] At this level of political life, the course of events during the past 10 years affords us a first glimpse of regional divergencies. [668] It is a significant fact that Senegal was not the first French West African territory in which a movement making political demands of some magnitude arose. The acute crises of the immediate post-war period developed elsewhere—in the Ivory Coast—with the founding and expansion of the [665] Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the first political party in French Africa (Black) with nationalistic tendencies. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain never succeeded in establishing itself firmly in Senegal, either before or after its change of policy in the 1950's.[6] There is no space here to describe in detail the historical and social background of such events, though I shall have to refer to it several times later in this paper. Some of the basic traits will suffice for mention: aspects of the traditional structures, of contemporary economic development, of the schools' endeavour to promote assimilation.

[563] The principal racial groups inhabiting Senegal,[7] whatever their cultural differences, and whatever their traditional hostility to one another (which has still by no means completely disappeared) all had the same type of social and political organization. They were strictly graded societies divided into endogamous castes, each with its special economic, political, ritual and other functions. In the present context, inter-caste antagonisms and incompatibilities are as a rule more important than racial antagonisms, since several racial groups may have equivalent social gradings or one may have borrowed and adapted another's gradings. This is a fundamental feature; it indicates the framework within which we can explain the problem of relations between [554] the traditional and the modernist elites. For instance, prestige due to education may be superimposed on prestige based on tradition, in particular prestige due to caste; or else the two may be completely separate.[8] Even today a high

---

1. Either officially or more or less 'clandestinely'.
2. E.g. in South Dahomey.
3. In the Ivory Coast, for example, a period of calm and co-operation followed when the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain dropped certain extreme claims.
4. Trade counters have existed for more than three centuries and the more specifically colonial period began more than a hundred years ago.
5. It had four municipalities with full privileges which sent a deputy to the French Parliament.
6. It broke off its alliance with the French Communist party.
7. The Ouolof, the Toucouleur and the Serers.
8. The resistance of the traditional ruling strata to foreign influence explains why, in certain cases, the lower castes were the first to go to school.

[175] [177]

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37
p. 450

178 571 masses, it found in the 'colonial elite' the go-between it needed for the resumption of contact to which it aspired.

The activity of this new elite is beginning to be discernible in its political and trade union work, and its basic aspirations can be defined. As has already been said, a Western-type political life was introduced fairly early in one part of Senegal. Political parties were formed; after 1946, their influence extended throughout the territory. In a recent paper[1] we stated that they had become, in the 'four communes', an almost traditional part of the social system. Once they reached the whole of Senegal, they acquired an enormous body of followers, the divisions among whom reflected successively—or simultaneously, according to the district—a number of historical, social, ethnic and family rifts. Thus, the antagonism between the Socialist party and the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, which has been a salient factor over recent years, did but reproduce according to time and place, the antagonism between former 'citizens' and former 'subjects', Ouolof and non-Ouolof, Moslems and Catholics, one Moslem sect and another, etc. On the whole, the 'colonial elite' has assumed the leadership of these parties.[2] But recent surveys have shown that, in the urban centres at any rate, membership in a political party might be commoner among the illiterate elements than among the 'educated'. This is a clear indication of the gap between the political parties and the present ambitions of the elites. A strongly held local position or the prestige of certain leaders is the reason why the traditional parties, though ill adapted to the present situation, have succeeded in keeping afloat. However, the waning influence of the Socialist party (the oldest organized party) was the sign after 1950 of the start of a new phase. The young elite from the liberal professions, followed by numerous young members of the 'colonial elite', remained markedly aloof from these movements, which seemed to efford no opportunity for the political action in which they intended to engage. Their sympathies went to a movement of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain type, although they were unable to impose it because of the strong positions held by the traditional parties. Yet some of the more influential members of this young elite finally decided to join the Senegalese party which seemed to have the strongest hold over the popular masses, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.[3] There, they will doubtless play an important role. The point has been reached at which the new elite is seeking to take over the torch from the 'colonial elite', but with political ambitions of a much more radical nature; I shall consider later the ideological aspects of the problem. In the case of the trade unions, the position is slightly different. Their activity,[4] of recent origin, soon acquired deeper significance. The more energetic elements of the 'administrative bourgeoisie', in alliance with the still small working-class elite, embarked in the trade unions on a course of action which was more directly effective than that of the political parties.[5] The climate of thought, directly or indirectly influenced by theories of Marxist origin, favoured the growth of an awareness of the 'colonial situation'. In this respect, however, the new intellectual elite played

●665 178 571 [369] 460 178 571 [013]

1. Cf. P. Mercier, *An Experimental Investigation conducted by means of Questionnaires in the town of Dakar*, report presented to the Conference on the Social Impact of Industrialization and Urban Problems, organized by Unesco at Abidjan, 1954.
2. As have, needless to say, certain members of an elite formed from the liberal professions, which had already emerged before the war.
3. In which they represent the 'left' wing.
4. Most of the unions are affiliated to the trade union federations in France.
5. And more resolutely modernist in its outlook.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

territories of the Federation. This has made the French very bitter against the Americans. As it is, the French are notoriously anti-American, and nowhere was this more pronounced than in Dakar when I was there. Memories of the incident at Little Rock were still fresh. One official told me triumphantly:

'When Holmes, Foster Dulles' plenipotentiary, came to Dakar to patch up the effect of Little Rock, which, I might say, had a profound effect on Africans here, the local people told him that they were astonished that the Federal Government of the U.S.A. could not control a State Governor. Of course,' he continued, a vicious light in his eyes, 'the best thing was at the Youth Conference at Abidjan, in Ivory Coast. The local American Consul went there in his large car, Stars and Stripes flying. When these young Africans talked about independence he clapped, and smiled when they passed resolutions in its favour. Then they called for a vote censuring Little Rock. He had to get up and leave!'

After meeting the young African at the 'lunch' in the Grand Conseil, Arnold was very surprised by the moderate views of Monsieur Doudou Guèye, a leading politician of French Africa's largest party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine, whom we met in his office in the same building. He is President of the Permanent Commission of the Grand Conseil, and a man with a record much more extremist than Nkrumah. He received us in a large office, overlooking the Atlantic, immaculately dressed and radiating an air of efficiency.

'In French West Africa,' he told us, 'independence is not so simple as in British West Africa, where you have practised indirect rule, preserving much of the old tribal system, the power of the Chiefs, and native law. Here most of that is destroyed. We have had to build up a new life for ourselves. Independence is therefore much more difficult. Anyway I don't think Ghana has much advantage over us. Our new *Loi Cadre* has given internal responsibility to the Africans who, in effect, run everything. The main strings France pulls are economic.'

It all seemed so smooth now, very remote from the fiery words of Arnold's friend. But Doudou Guèye, like many of his party, had been persecuted by the French. He had been in prison during the years 1948, 1949 and 1950. He did not seem bitter

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

665
G48

about it, and even waved a letter at me which he said he had just received from his old prison governor.

'If we politicians hadn't been in prison we would never have got what we have today. Other politicians who did not go to prison suffered more than I did.'

He seemed to take a far more mature view of his party's experience of prison than Nkrumah and his 'prison graduates' do. One could see that Doudou Guèye would never parade on French West African Independence Day in a prisoner's hat. Though he and his party members would have much more reason to.

Later we met a leader of R.D.A., with a record much more extreme than that of Doudou Guèye. Gabriel D'Arboussier, Vice-President of the Grand Conseil, had once been as good as a member of the Communist Party. The R.D.A., too, had been very much a fellow-travelling party, which even now is organized on the Communist cell basis. 'We owe a lot to the Communists, who taught us and trained us,' Doudou Guèye had told us. But D'Arboussier, a mulatto from Djenne in Soudan, is no longer a Communist, and R.D.A. has moved steadily away from the left. The Communists hate D'Arboussier today as a traitor to the cause, but this has lost him little, for he is now at the forefront of French African politics.

He received us in his plush office, sat us both in large armchairs, and instead of viewing us from the fortress of his very large desk, sat in the third armchair. He talked in fluent and excellent English. We talked about Africa.

'The great problem of Africa is the creation of a united people and the breakdown of tribal factions. When we stress the need for unity in Africa, I think it is because consciously or unconsciously in Africa it is clear to us that the element of division is very great. We shall have to fight very hard to achieve it.' Arnold: 'Do you think we will ever succeed?' D'Arboussier looked doubtfully at us for a moment. I said I thought that the impact of the various Colonial powers in Africa and the imposition of their culture and tradition in the African peoples would make unity difficult, at least in the immediate future. He nodded agreement.

'What is important,' D'Arboussier said, 'is the African way of

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

living. What we must preserve completely is that, though, of course, I realize, it is no longer possible to treat the economic and political problems of Africa on the level of the tribes. However, what Africa could give to the West, is the sense of democratic function. People tend to laugh at the institution of the village palaver house, but it is the great school of politics. Decisions there are taken on the basis not of a majority but of unanimity. They will talk night and day till the last man in the village is convinced their common action is right.'

Arnold looked at D'Arboussier somewhat suspiciously when he talked largely about the 'African' and his personality. As a Creole, Arnold, I think, detected D'Arboussier's own dilemma, as a Mulatto, who was not sure where he belonged. To Africa or Europe?

For a man who had once been a Communist sympathizer D'Arboussier was surprisingly moderate. There was no talk of independence or an immediate rupture with France.

'We have decided that absolute independence would be a burden,' he told me.

One of my best friends in Dakar was a young Toucouleur, of my own age, who was a member of the newly formed Partie Africane de L'Independence, which was in complete opposition to the creation of any Franco-African Community, who believed that France exploited Africa, and the sooner Africa was rid of her the better.

He himself was extremely well-educated, with no immediately obvious motive for bitterness against the French. Indeed, it was a Frenchman who introduced me to him. He took me to the headquarters of the party, a small bookshop in a side street of Dakar. It was well decorated, and its shelves were lined with books on Marxist Socialism and Communism, a lesser Colletts. Mixed with picture books about Rumania and Russia and the Chinese way of life were the French Classics. Mahjemout Diop, one of the leaders of this party, as yet with little influence, received me in his office and lectured me on the evils of French administration. There was something clandestine about our encounter in this side office and yet with Africans in power at the Grand Conseil, and with an African Prime Minister of the Senegal I could not help thinking his anti-colonialist crusade a

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 little misguided. He handed me a copy of the party manifesto.
648 On the front it read:

> 'At the historic moment of Bandung and of the Colonial and Imperialist system, at the moment when political confusion submerges Black Africa under French domination, our duty as Africans obliges us to bring before the masses of our country the problem of national independence and the transformation of our economy into a socialist economy.'

[204] He also handed me a copy of the party newspaper, *La Lutte*, 'The Battle', which is surprisingly well produced at an intellectual level. It even had an article explaining why Sputnik stayed up. On another page a cartoon demonstrated party feeling towards France: Picture I. Thin, Belsen figure, in casque colonial, sucks from straw the lifeblood of Africa—Picture II. Fatter version of this Frenchman leaves for home, a small Africa behind him.

But the magazine was directed not only against France. Jibes were made at the Minister of the Interior of the Senegal, and at the high wages paid to Ministers. Mahjemout Diop was later arrested on the orders of the Minister of the Interior.

OLD SENEGAL

Dakar—Gorée—St. Louis

369 [491] 361 [175] Our third afternoon in Dakar, Arnold and I took the afternoon ferry to Gorée, a tiny island embraced by the bay of Dakar. This island, which until the turn of the century was better known than Dakar itself, was discovered in 1444 by Dinis Dias, one of the early Portuguese explorers, and commands the entrance to the port of Dakar, so that for long it was prized as the most strategic of islands on the Guinea Coast. Today it is no more than an historical relic, but whether against a clear blue sky or of dark grey rain clouds massing for an assault on the mainland, it serves as a reminded that though in Africa the revolution has taken place largely over the last ten years, its groundwork has been prepared by centuries of contact with Europeans and their way of life.

The small ferry was crammed with trippers, armed with

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

The Growth of Political Parties

668 This political tradition explains why the changes in Senegal after 1946 took a unique coloring, and why Senegal's subsequent political history has been considerably different from that of other French West African territories. The political changes instituted after WW II [633] represented in part a loss of privileged position for the four communes, though they continued to play a dominant role for several years.[21] This was one of the factors that made the period 1946-1956 one of transition.

668 One important development was the • 665 appearance of well-structured political parties. Pre-war political life had been characterized by clusters of followers assembled about influential leaders, in a framework that somewhat resembled that of a "republic of notables." This pattern was still common in 1946; the nature of parties changed only gradually. On the other hand, political life broadened to include the whole territory. The long-standing predominance enjoyed by the coastal cities persisted for a few years but the weight of their electorate fell rapidly.[22] The emerging ideologies and the newly-founded political organizations were oriented toward the satisfaction of wants quite different from those typical of the old urban populations. But the models and the leaders that the latter had produced retained an influence that greatly exceeded their geographic limits, and in the cities they receded only slowly before the growth of a political life with different roots.

The fact that the post-war institutional developments were not transplanted to virgin soil had two contradictory results. On the one hand, a political party that was merely a branch of a

[P. 9A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[P. 3A]
[P.3 contains no textual material]

Political Life in the Urban Centers of Senegal: A Study of a Period of Transition

Senegal and Sudan presently comprise the Mali Federation, which is in the process of achieving sovereignty within the French Community. Senegal itself is one of the most urbanized West African regions, and its cities have been characterized by a gradual growth of modern political life. The author presents some major findings on its urban political activity, based on extensive interviews made in the mid-1950's. The oldest urban elite, almost entirely assimilated into the French way of life, has been only partially successful in developing party organizations that satisfy the interests of the newer urban residents. As a consequence, the most active and radical post-war political activity has been centered in "non-political" bodies, notably labor unions. Also, urban political activity has been increasingly challenged by rural political developments, which have drawn their framework from urban politics. African specialists will note that Senegalese political development has much in common with such development elsewhere in Africa; it also has a number of distinctive features.

The article originally appeared in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIE, *XXVII (July-December, 1959), pp. 55-84, under the title,* "La vie politique dans les centres urbains du Sénégal." *It was translated by T. H. Stevenson.*

396

French party — the S.F.I.O.[23] — developed and for several years played a dominant role throughout Senegal. In the other territories parties were more often purely local, and simply allied themselves with the French parties. The S.F.I.O. lost its predominence in Senegal after 1951, but kept it in the four communes — St. Louis and Dakar-Gorée being its chief strongholds; it remained there as the African Socialist Movement.[24] This result, the adoption of assimilationist views, was to a certain degree a characteristic of pre-war political life, but on the other hand it contributed to the leadership of the first party that tried to be at once interterritorial and specifically African: the African Democratic Assembly (R.D.A.). It provided some of the most radical elements in the movement, which received considerable support, especially at Dakar. Several radical leaders were the source of the conflicts that resulted in the split in the R.D.A. that followed the change of orientation after 1950. The R.D.A. was subsequently a rather marginal movement in Senegal. This second result suggests the strength of the relations of a party limited to the numerous elite of the old Senegalese cities with the great European currents of political thought.

But the greatest effect of the diversification of Senegalese political life was felt elsewhere. The appearance and rapid success of the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (B.D.S.) — which stemmed from a division in the S.F.I.O. — were the manifestations, in the political realm, of two essential facts: (1) the important changes that had taken place in the composition of city populations; and (2) the resumption of initiative by the rural populations, who seized the opportunity to express themselves directly, and especi-

[P. 9 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[21] A very significant portion of the present framework emerged from the "four communes."
[22] Until 1957, universal suffrage existed only in the four communes. In the rest of Senegal the franchise, which was very limited in 1946, was extended to more and more people. The organic law of 1956 abolished all restrictions.
[23] Translator's note: French section of the Workingmen's International: the French Socialist Party, attached to the old Second International.
[24] In 1956. The municipal elections of the same year showed clearly the extent of its influence, which was unimportant in the interior cities.

[p.96]

968 M55 GA7

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 ally to express themselves in opposition
665 to the old cities. The legislative elections
369 of 1951 were typical in this respect. The
666 enlarged rural electorate had numerical control and held the key to success in the elections; a substantial part of the urban masses shared in an effort to drive a breach in the old system of urban domination. In this period the ideological aspects of the political parties were still unimportant. The elections of 1951 were a victorious revolt of the new citizens, urban and rural, against the old citizens of the "four communes."[25] The two candidates of the B.D.S. won. Significantly, one of them represented directly, through the unions, the new forces. The division between the whole of the territory and the cities was thus repeated *within* the cities. A new phase had commenced, one in which politics became more complicated. But the forms that can be termed "traditional" for political life were too deeply embedded within the patterns of urban life to give way at once.

Senegalese Political Life in Transition, 1953-1956

668 It was under such conditions that re-
665 searches were conducted on the forms of
[114] political expression in several Senegalese urban centers, chiefly at Dakar-Gorée and at St. Louis — that is, three of the four communes — and also at Thiès, a newer city in the interior close to and under the influence of the Dakar-Gorée-Rufisque aggregate. This last study provided certain comparative materials. This essay discusses only some of the findings of these researches. Three essential facts must be remembered:

(1) The importance retained by certain long-standing patterns. A party de-

[p. 10A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca.1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 signed to be distinctive, and to a degree
● 665 founded in opposition to these patterns, nevertheless conforms with them, at least for a time, within the "old cities." This is one of the limits of the political system of this period: the deepest political aspirations, which are rapidly gaining strength, can be only partially expressed within a partisan structure.

(2) The central role of certain non-political groupings and organizations[26] in the elaboration of more radical ideologies and in the formation of the most active groups. This must be viewed as a direct function of the preceding condition.

[571] (3) The temporarily marginal status of an important part of the new elites, whose formation had accelerated in the post-war years. At the time of study, a shift of elites was occurring. Youthful elements were vigorously opposed to what was termed the "bourgeoisie of the old cities."[27] This is another indication that the underlying forces still laid outside urban politics; they did not enter them until 1956.

The New Parties

665 After 1946 a series of political parties
369 emerged: the Senegalese branch of the S.F.I.O., the B.D.S., the M.P.S., and the U.D.S.[28] Only the first two received wide support, yet one cannot fail to be impressed by the extent of party membership. Out of a group of 1,200 men interviewed at Dakar, for example, more than half (56 per cent) declared themselves members of a party.[29] The percentage was very high, and of considerable significance. The population involved in this sampling was essentially a stable one, or at least one settled in cities for several years. Other researches justify

[P. 10 B]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[25] At the time, the civil administration viewed this revolt rather favorably. Of course, it was only one aspect of the politics of the period. Some rather contradictory alliances were formed to oppose the S.F.I.O.

[26] Assuming a limited sense for the word "political," by applying it solely to party organizations.

[27] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56). Materials for comparison appear, *mutatis mutandis*, in E.-F. Frazier, *Bourgeoisie noire*, Paris, 1956.

[28] Senegalese Populist Movement and Senegalese Democratic Union.

[29] This involved solely the male population.

[P.10C]

299
P63
G68

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

S 665 369 the assertion that the temporary population, especially the seasonal one, shared very little in urban politics.[30] However, the groupings under study clearly extended beyond the nucleus of the "old population," which in Dakar was less sharply defined and more conglomerate than in a center such as St. Louis.[31] The traits peculiar to the latter were still discernible, however: thus, the majority ethnic group — Lebou and Wolof, which includes the largest number of "old urban families" — exhibited these political characteristics in a more striking form. Exact data gathered on extended family groups revealed political party membership varying from 50 to 80 per cent among the Lebou and Wolof (as much among women as among men); in these cases, membership was verified by possession of a party card. This verification was not required in the course of the general study previously noted; one may thus assume that some of the men interviewed who declared themselves members of a party were only sympathizers, or had failed to have their cards renewed. Other data, however, confirmed the validity of the information obtained. Thus, during the post-war years the Senegal branch of the S.F.I.O. was among the six most important branches of the party; in the mid-1950's the enormous majority of its adherents were to be found in the coastal cities.

W [369]

W [665]

One peculiarity, examined in the course of this essay, requires at least a partial interpretation. Considering the massive party membership, participation in elections was scanty. Thus, at the time of the last municipal elections in Dakar, the number of persons registered to vote exceeded 50,000.[32] According to the

S [666]

[P. 11A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665
369
[666]

census of 1955, one might have expected it to reach nearly 80,000. Abstentions — in relation to the number registered — amounted to about 30 per cent. In this trend one can see the ambiguity that typified political life in the Senegalese cities. Evidence was also gathered on the status of participation in the other phases of party activity. Parties are organized in ward sections, sometimes with separate sections for women. The activities of these sections do not merit detailed study; they vary too greatly in intensity. One point became clear, however, from direct observation on one hand and the results of a series of interviews on the other: these sectional activities drew only a very limited portion — about 10 per cent — of party effectives. By contrast, occasional demonstrations might draw considerable numbers, including individuals from outside the city. Sometimes such demonstrations coincided with propaganda meetings organized directly by the party. In other cases they stemmed from the presence of a party leader as an observer at an official reception, a conference, etc.

Other facts also demonstrate that party membership does not imply militant action in the specifically political arena. A series of interviews carried out during 1953-1954 revealed only a slight degree of ideological unity in the two large parties, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S.; knowledge about specific phases of their programs was generally modest or nonexistant. Hence distribution of party memberships scarcely involved a precise ideological choice.[33] This choice to some degree reflected an actual distinction,[34] but this was apparently no more than a tendency. In addition to the primary

[P. 11 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[30] But it could remain attached more or less firmly to the political activities of the place of its origin.
[31] It included elements from St. Louis and Gorée, Lebou elements that had become urbanized "on the spot," etc. The population of Dakar tripled 1936-1956, from 80,000 to nearly 250,000.
[32] To be precise, 52,250. These elections are used as an example because the new organization for the city government involved a revision of the electoral lists, the most extensive in many years; and, also, a comparison with recent census figures (compiled in 1955) was possible for the first time.
[33] The facts of the split between the latent ideological content of judgments and opinions of a political sort, and that of the party programs, are noted below. Of course, there were probably distinctions according to level of schooling.
[34] Roughly, between old and new city-dwellers.

[II C]

[322] [911] 322 bc

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 369 cause of this peculiarity, described previously, there were secondary causes, of ethnic, religious, and other natures. Their action contributed to the blurring of lines between the party groups. These facts explain, for example, why the B.D.S., until its recent changes, was unable despite great efforts to change the nature of urban politics. Only the broad action of new factors that were felt considerably beyond the frontiers of Senegal, from 1956 on, brought some change.

These widespread occurrences affected chiefly the two large parties. The other parties, the M.P.S. and U.D.S., which had developed from the schism in the R.D.A., had a quite different nature. They were parties of activists, and in Senegalese political life had only secondary importance. The successes of the R.D.A. elsewhere in West Africa, even during 1956-1957, had only feeble repercussions in Senegal. This fact had many causes, which cannot be studied here. By contrast, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S. were tending to become, in terms of number, parties with mass support; their cores were made up as much by "*notables*" and "elected agents" as by activists. The struggle between these two parties continued to dominate the stage, if not in all Senegal, at least in the cities and in certain rural districts.[35] In some cases it took extremely violent forms. 666 665 369 [633] [519] Pre-election riots were common between 1946 and 1956. Even in 1957, rather serious incidents marked the reorganization of the commune of Dakar, before the last municipal elections.[36] For the first time, elements of the B.D.S. (now the Senegalese Populist Bloc, or B.P.S.) won strong representation in the city council, previously dominated without opposition by the S.F.I.O. (now the African Socialist Movement — M.S.A.); an outburst of partisan passions marked

[P. 12A]

[665] this shift. Such demonstrations revealed
[369] the intense hostility between the two
[666] main parties. This deeply influenced urban life, in the realms that overlapped into the specifically political domain.

Some indications have been given as to the significance of party membership. They can be supplemented by approaching the problem somewhat differently. To a considerable degree, the parties remained closely associated with the "clienteles" that typified pre-war political life. This trait appeared most clearly in the party in power, the one that controlled the city government. To maintain and increase
[669] such a political clientele, the party had access to very important instruments. Through the numerous municipal employees and all others who depended upon city hall, or who directly or indirectly benefited from its aid or its support, it extended a very wide network of influence. This was elaborated by the other network of influence, comprising the traditionally influential individuals, who were partly interwoven into it.[37] If a party had such a basis its dynamic force dropped considerably, and the role of its leaders assumed major importance. The prestige of the leader was essential to the cohesion of the political groups. This fact came out clearly in various researches. For instance, in the course of over 100 interviews it appeared that there were wide gaps between the official orientation of the party to which the respondent belonged and the political goals that he expressed.[38] Adherence to the leader overcame that difference to some extent. A certain formalization of partisan attachment thus appeared, in a primitive fashion. The importance of the leader's prestige was revealed with the greatest clarity in relation to the feminine clien-
[369] tele of the parties. It must be emphasized that at Dakar, at least among the
[P. 12 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[35] Where the rivalry, furthermore, was chiefly between the "outposts," in this case more or less connected with the tradition of the "old cities," and the surrounding countryside.
[36] The separation of Gorée and the anticipated electoral redistricting had persuaded the civil administration to dissolve the municipal council and to replace it during the electoral period with a bipartisan municipal commission.
[37] Particularly in their activity as electoral agents.
[38] In a general way, these goals showed a much more definite "nationalist" potential.

[p.12 c]

[633] 666 3691 665

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 369 elements that have been urbanized the longest, the percentage of party memberships has been as high among women as among men. This was a peculiar aspect of the Dakar situation, not found, for instance, at Thiès (where the percentage of memberships among women, depending upon the ethnic group, was from one-half to one-tenth that among men). At Dakar the women's branches on occasion could mobilize large crowds, adorned in party colors. Study of about 30 of these individual cases suggested that the conscious essence of political attachment consisted almost entirely of the relation with the leader.

665 578 The formalization noted above can be studied from various points of view. The fundamental bipartition of political life in a way was responsible for the indirect expression of intragroup and intergroup divisions and rivalries whose nature was other than political. This explains why the line of separation between the two political blocs did not have the same significance to all sectors of the population. In specific situations it assumed many meanings. For example, one could find: (1) hostility between the Lebou-Wolof grouping and the rest of the population (which resembled, without exactly corresponding to, the fundamental division noted above); (2) hostility, more or less muted, between Wolof and Lebou; and (3) hostilities within each of the two groups, in proportion to diversities of origin, status, etc.

[563]

This accounts for the relative flexibility prevailing in the composition of the clienteles that made up the parties.[89] Since the clienteles represented varied levels, however, they introduced new divisions, or revived and solidified old hostilities.

665 (1) A fundamental problem arises from the interactions between the modern political system and what remains of the traditional or semi-traditional sys-

[P.13A]

665 [633] tems. At Dakar, the powers of the "*sérigne*" and of the dignitaries of the former "Lebou Republic" were continued, although they gradually lost their importance.[40] The parties were careful to keep these leading figures among their clientele. As a result there were some rather complex manipulations concerning nominations and successions. A nomination accepted by one party was more or less openly contested by the other. Hence the relatively frequent bifurcation of power: opposing the dignitary who had received official recognition was another who maintained himself as pretender, with the support of the party that had backed his candidacy. Such events stood [667] out even more sharply among ward leaders, who depended most directly upon the party that controlled the city government. Their support was more or less confined to the voters of this party. Hence certain wards had clandestine ward leaders, around whom the members of the opposition party could gather. Of course, such phenomena have accelerated the deterioration of these institutions.

793 665 (2) In the religious field, control over chiefs of the great Moslem brotherhoods similarly has been at stake in intense struggles between the parties. This was particularly true of the main brotherhood in Senegal, that of the Tidjanes. [369] This problem has been centered outside Dakar and the other coastal cities, but has had important repercussions in these cities. The rivalries that apparently have always surrounded the choice of the caliph of the Tidjanes were intensified and acquired a greater impact, in proportion as the fundamental hostility of the parties was openly associated with them. Violent incidents involving political enemies occurred [788] even on pilgrimages to Tivaouane, where the caliph resides; they contributed to the prolongation of conflicts within the caliph's family. Well-meaning interference by re-

[P. 13 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[39] We found, for example, that extended family groups with some degree of solidarity might be divided in political views. This caused severe tensions, but rarely breaks.
[40] *Cf.* C. Michel, *op. cit.* The civil administration continued to grant some prominence to the *sérigne* of Dakar, and ultimately used him as a propaganda agent in some of its activities outside Senegal.

[P.13C]

6665 [638] [638]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 [193] spected figures, with the aim of keeping such matters on a purely religious plane, has had little success. The Tidjane chieftans have been too enmeshed in politics to listen.

527 665 578 (3) A last example involves recreational activities organized at the end of the year around the exhibition of the "lanterns."[41] These activities provided a basis for the formation of temporary groupings founded on ethnic background, neighborhood, occupation, etc. Such groupings undertook the making of a "lantern," and exhibited it to neighbors, relatives and others, eventually by forming a parade. An element of competition entered; the most noteworthy "lanterns" won rather imposing gifts and a brief prestige for the groupings that exhibited them. The parties seized on this competitive aspect. Party sections themselves created "lantern" groupings. With access to considerable material means and a large number of workers, they made "lanterns" that were veritable carnival floats, huge and very elaborate. Their exhibition brought together in a procession the typical rabble of large political demonstrations. At the same time it aroused friction between hostile parties.[42] They had taken over, almost entirely at their expense, demonstrations whose character they had utterly changed. This is a typical example of the way in which disparate activities have been infused by the two-party rivalry.

369 665 This process also has another side: the parties have seen a decline in their opportunities for expressing political drives. In the old cities, they experienced relative stagnation for some years, while social changes accelerated and intensified. Elements just becoming aware of the world

[P. 14A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

369 political situation remained aloof from
• 665 party activity, unless they joined the marginal parties. This was a prime discovery from general investigations at Dakar and St. Louis. Comparison of the principal socio-occupational categories that had been used as a basis for classifying the population under study provided informative data for this topic. The following categories showed a percentage of political party membership [463] higher than that of the average of respondents: farmers and fishermen; unskilled laborers and domestic workers; merchants. By contrast, the percentage of membership was lower among semi-skilled workers, higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, and professional people. It is significant that trained workers and the intellectual elements most often kept apart from the existing political system. Such was the situation at Dakar. That at St. Louis was little different, or so it appeared from an incomplete analysis of an inquiry carried out among a sampling of the population in the island wards.

By contrast, the inquiry carried out at Thiès, whose traits are quite unlike those of the "old cities," provided very different results. For all the men, the percentage of membership was smaller than that at Dakar—40 per cent.[43] The following categories were below that fig- [463] ure: farmers, merchants, skilled workers, lower-ranking office-workers, and government employees. On the other hand, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, were higher.[44] Here the greatest degree of party membership corresponded to the most active categories; Thiès does not have the political traditions of the old cities, and the formalization found in them was much less

[P. 148]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[41] At first these were merely decorated lanterns. The custom certainly has a European origin; it is typical of the "old cities" of Senegal.
[42] In 1954 the parades of "lanterns" were prohibited by administrative edict.
[43] The results at Dakar and at Thiès cannot be compared in detail. However, the informative value of these general results could, in each case, be verified at other stages in the research.
[44] It should be noted that in the case of Thiès the category of unskilled workers was much closer to that of semi-skilled workers. The unskilled workers, largely employed by the railroad, comprise a more stable group than at Dakar.

[P. 14C]

* [i.e an exhibition of "lanterns" at the end of the year accompanied by recreational activities — See category 116, P. 14A -- Analyst]

665 369 [1957] [1958] [1960] [1978]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

369 665 striking. The data from Thiès enable one to approach in a much more meaningful way the problem of differentiating between the two large Senegalese parties in terms of their socio-occupational composition. Adherence to the B.D.S. was generally predominant in all categories, but the trend toward this party was greater, on the one hand, among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and on the other, among higher-ranking office-workers and government employees. At Dakar, where the B.D.S. was at this time in the minority, a comparable trend was apparent: the party was proportionately stronger among semi-skilled workers and intellectuals. But differentiations of this type cannot fail to be blurred in a context such as that described above.

665 668 Therefore the importance of the groups remaining on the edge of party activities was more significant. Two groups merit particular attention. These were, first, the new cadres emerging from higher education; the problems resulting from their emergence are briefly discussed below. Secondly, there was a rather large group of persons less than thirty years old who had at least a primary school education.[45] The criticisms that the latter expressed against the established political system were often very harsh (against the city government, against the cadres of the two parties, etc.). Some had made several attempts to gain admittance to the existing parties, or into youth groups affiliated with the parties. They found themselves in weakly-structured, short-lived groups with no specific political function, but in which political problems were approached in a generally nonconformist manner. Otherwise they devoted their energies to organized nonpolitical groupings.

The importance of some of these nonpolitical groupings must now be examined. To a large degree they offered, more

[P. 15A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 than the relatively inflexible political par-
668 ties, adequate frameworks for expressing anti-colonial demands and for creating activists.

Religious Organizations

665 As distinct from many other parts of
668 Sub-Sahara Africa, organizations of a
793 religious character play only a very limited part here. We have already seen how the "traditional" political parties entered into the activities of some religious groups and attempted to make them recruiting bases for their clientele. The more limited movements alone provided certain means, chiefly indirect, for expressing extremist political demands. This was the case, for example, of a grouping founded by Moslem students at Dakar. However, they received very little support.[48]

Cultural Associations and Youth Movements

668 Cultural associations and youth move-
595 ments have had a more important role in this area. Some of them have contributed to the formation of strong political cadres. In general, the cultural associations have had a rather precarious existence; their activities in some cases have ceased. Their efforts to win the support of the masses by undertaking an educational role — for instance, by means of the theater — have often been disappointing. Finally, they often have had a
[369] ambiguous nature. Thus, in a city such as Dakar, founded by highly "assimilated" elements, they have experienced some difficulty in contributing to the development of modernized African culture. But they are not devoid of concern for political organization in a very general sense, removed from party orientation. This was shown with regard to three of the

[P. 15 B]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[45] Often, youths whose studies had been interrupted. It was difficult for them to achieve occupational stability.
[46] Its policies called for a renovation of Islam, so that it came more or less directly into opposition with the great Brotherhoods, whose religious formalism was rather marked; the latter retained a generally dominant influence.

[p. 15 C]

[1962] 668 595

8:Mercier E-5 (ca.1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 most vigorous associations, by an investi-
575 gation of the topics discussed by the study groups that they created, and of the content of the discussion.[47] By considering such questions as teaching and the language for teaching, the organization of local communities, economic development, interracial marriages, etc., their study of the political problems resulting from the colonial situation had wide influence.

As for the Youth Council of Senegal,
[369] which comprised the majority of youth associations and was organized primarily in the cities, the orientation of its activity was even clearer. By the nature of its conflicts with the civil administration, by the content of its demands in behalf of youth, by the topics related to the future of youth whose study it was undertaking, it disclosed a "nationalist" potential of some vigor.

It is essential to note the possible role of associations founded on ethnic or territorial bases, in particular those inspired by youths. Centers for contact with territories other than Senegal, they spread
• [665] the foreign political influence of the parties predominating within them. This seemed to be the case, for instance, of the grouping of Senegalese youths with relation to the R.D.A. However, these associations were never directly linked with a given partisan organization. The political role that they might temporarily play was very flexible and therefore somewhat indeterminate.

Labor Unions

467 Labor unions should receive especial attention. The union movement in French West Africa is numerically one of the most important, and among the most active, in all of sub-Sahara Africa.
[665] Like the political parties, it took form only in the immediate post-war period.
[P.16A]

467 In 1954 it had a membership about 100,-
000, or a little less than one-third of all
wage-earners. The unions have reached
[369] their greatest development in Senegal,
especially in the large cities. In 1954
this territory contained more than half
the union members in French West
Africa, more than a third of all Sene-
galese wage-earners. Dakar has a central
role in this field. It is the headquarters
for the largest unions, which were once
affiliated with French federations but
are now autonomous. Dakar also pos-
sesses a very active "Labor Exchange."
By itself it contains more than two-fifths
of the union members in Senegal.

467 To some extent the significance of
668 the unions is more than occupational
[667] and economic. The degree to which they
complete the political machinery of the
[665] city is suggested by a comparison of the
percentages of party memberships with
the percentages of union memberships.
Of 1,200 persons interrogated during the
Dakar survey noted above, about one-
half (52 per cent) stated they were
union members. The potential ambiguity
of such statements was suggested above
in connection with political parties.[48]
However, an analysis of the respondents
by socio-occupational categories gave
meaningful results. The average rate of
union membership was surpassed by
lower-ranking office-workers and govern-
ment employees, higher-ranking office-
workers and government employees, and
professional people; it was equalled by
semi-skilled workers. With the exception
[665] of the first, these are precisely the cate-
gories whose rates of party membership
were lowest. On the other hand, partici-
pation in union activity was distinctly
more important among the categories
comprising the intellectual elements than

[P. 16 B]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

467 668 [498] among the semi-skilled workers. The situation was reversed at Thiès, but because of the large Dakar-Niger Railroad shops there, this city is an exceptional case. The traits found at Dakar, by contrast, proved characteristic of unionism in French West Africa. The overall figures, obtained from official sources based on statements by unions, indicated clearly that manual occupations were the least unionized. Out of the 100,000 union members in French West Africa in [649] 1954, more than half were either government officials or government employees. The rate of unionization in the governmental sector was nearly double that in the non-governmental sector. Finally, in the two sectors together, semi-skilled workers comprised only a little more than a fourth of all union members. Furthermore, results of the studies at Dakar and Thiès suggest that union membership and level of schooling correlate rather closely; this was far from the [665] case with respect to party membership, at least at Dakar. To what degree did unionism offer educated individuals a means of expression that, in the period studied, parties did not offer them? Educated persons, especially youths, were more susceptible to extremist anti-colonial aspirations. And to what degree could union action present itself more clearly as a trial postponement for the existing order than action within the framework of parties?

The particular traits of union struggle markedly demonstrate the fundamental conflicts of the colonial situation. One cannot accurately speak of the "politization" of unions, in the sense many government officials give this term. The [665] limited activities of parties and the very conditions of unionism in a colonial situation have given unionism a marked political coloring.

(1) Interviews of militant unionists,
[P. 17A]

both in France and in other countries. Participation in international congresses put them in contact with the ideological currents of the world. A study of the union press was very revealing in this regard.

To the masses, unions proposed goals that were, in the period under consideration, far different from those of the political parties. Unions were in many ways more systematic and more vigorous. They were much less apt to make differentiations along ethnic, religious, or other lines. The unity of action that they practiced banned their assimilating such hostilities and conflicts, whose meaning was foreign to them. These hostilities yielded before the fundamental hostility brought out by union action. The near-unanimity with which the directives of the union have been followed is very significant. For the elites, on the other hand, unions offered, in an era in which the forms and matrices of customary political expression appeared too narrow, a wider and more adequate field of action. Unionism supplied the most accessible agencies for sharing in power of the modern sort. The intellectual elites furnished the substance of the union framework and played a dominant role on their executive committees.[82] Located at the very center of situations of tension and conflict, they found in union activities the most effective way of asserting modern views and of surmounting the limits barring their advancement in the political and occupational fields.

Developments Since 1956

Such were the chief aspects, in a period of transition, of the political life of the large Senegalese urban centers. In the subsequent four years, great changes have occurred. Senegalese political individuality — considerably modified by that of the "old cities" — has remained clear, but it has in great part shifted to

668 369 [563] change. The vast increase in the number of Europeans, their greater occupational diversification, the much stronger reaction to the facts of discrimination, and multiplication of competitive situations — occupational or otherwise — are the most obvious phases of this major phenomenon.[54]

As these factors have come into full operation, a new phase of political life has opened. These are its principal traits:

668 •665 [467] (1) From 1956 on, in unions and in politics, secessions from the original French bodies — confederations or parties — have multiplied. Previous remarks indicated the development of this process among unions. After some delay it affected the S.F.I.O. itself, which was transformed, not without difficulties, into the African Socialist Movement. The assimilationist tradition declined, or at least was no longer proclaimed openly. After the parties became autonomous, the distinction between direct and indirect forms of political expression began to disappear. Extremist demands of a nationalistic character found expression within the parties, and worked effectively there after 1957 (at the time when the new "organic law" authorized the first Senegalese government).

[571] (2) To a certain degree, the very old Senegalese political tradition once more became a driving force. At the same time the marginal elements, whose existence was particularly marked among intellectuals, entered into real politics, chiefly within the framework of the B.D.S. They comprised the left wing of the new Senegalese Populist Bloc (B.P.S.), which stemmed from the B.D.S., and shared in the creation of the African Convention, which is striving to extend outside Senegal the strictly autonomous orientations of the B.D.S. They tried to organize the B.D.S. as a

[P. 198]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 mass-party, but in patterns very different
•665 from those prevailing in the "old cities." Finally, their influence has been decisive in attempts to regroup the Senegalese parties, "disregarding personal and doctrinal differences." It has been a question of wiping out the fundamental hostility that typified post-war Senegalese political life, which — as we have seen — had more than a purely political significance. This effort led, not without difficulties, to the creation of the African Regroupment Party (P.R.A.). The former rivalries were still evident, though in a diminished and less forceful manner, during 1958-1959. The youthful elements of the B.P.S. at first helped provide the latter with leadership of the other territorial parties. It was they who, at the Congress of Cotonou, introduced the first outspoken assertion by the P.R.A. in favor of independence.[55]

[369] (3) However, the influence of the political tradition of the old cities has not been entirely discarded. Added to that of the conservative religious leaders, it helps account for a return to a moderate stand on the part of Senegal. The campaign for the referendum of 1958 showed

[P. 20 A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 this clearly; it was under this two-fold
● 665 pressure that the B.P.S. took a position in favor of "yes." It likewise accounts for the less extreme attitudes often taken by leaders within the new Mali Federation.[58] However, this influence of tradition is not sufficient to block new trends. It is significant that in the legislative
[666] elections of March, 1959, the Senegalese Solidarity Party (P.S.S.), a combination of conservative city and rural elements, was as thoroughly defeated at St. Louis, where victory seemed probable, as in the rural districts. Again, it should be noted that the youthful elements that entered the B.P.S. in 1956 have in part left the new Senegalese Progressive Union (U.P.S.), an offshoot of the latter party after the regrouping noted above. By founding the African-Senegalese Regroupment Party (P.R.A.-S.), they have hoped to express their disappointment with a party insufficiently radical, insufficiently organized in structure, and containing too many aspects of the "traditional" political life of the old cities.

Paul Mercier
École pratique des Hautes Études

[P. 20 B]

17: Mercier--17 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/19 cont./

369x
563
[361]

differences in the daily rhythm are the arguments put forward by those who do not use purely racist arguments.

fact on the differences in economic status.

c) In principle there is no segregation in social life, either; certain public places, however (cafés, bars, etc.), strive directly or indirectly, to secure for themselves a purely European clientele. On the other hand, many clubs and associations of a recreational nature exclude Africans in fact (it is rarely statutory). The syndicates themselves, although they are not in principle founded on a racial basis, do not effect a mixing of Africans and Europeans, as a result of the divergence of interests and claims; the strikes, when they occur, are in practice purely African. Finally, the political parties are for the most part almost exclusively African; the European population as a whole is disinterested in local political activity. [575] [467] [468] [665]

d) Essentially the relations between Africans and Europeans are: relations at the place of work, between colleagues and, much more often, between subordinates and superiors, employees and bosses; relations between masters and domestics at home; common participation in cultural and sportive activities; relations between teachers and pupils or students. Relations of a more personal character(regular relationships, friendships, etc.) are much rarer. Intermarriages -- almost exclusively between African men and European women -- have a particular significance; there are practically none that have been contracted locally.

/20/ e) Here we shall not touch on the area of interracial judgments and attitudes, which must be the subject of more detailed investigations. It will suffice to say that all the observations made permit one to conclude that there is a